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T
A.

ARGUMENT

The June 11, 1996 Proceedings Were Not a Motion for Summary
Judgment; The Trial Court Made Evidentiary Rulings on No
Evidence; The Olches Misrepresent the Record,
At the conclusion of the June 6, 1996 hearing the trial court

gave no indication that the hearing to begin two hours before the
June 11 trial would be anything in the nature of a summary judgment
hearing:

"The Court is persuaded that the issue of whether or not

the question of specific performance is for the judge or jury to
decide should be argued and ruled upon prior to trial.

Resolution

of this issue would have substantial bearing on the amount of time
needed for trial."

(R. 1143).

The only summary judgment proceeding in this case occurred on
December 11, 1995, before Judge Frank G. Noel.

Judge Noel denied

the Olches' motion, finding in his order1 that the parties had

1

At page 18 n.3 of their opposing brief, the Olches argue that
Judge Noel's order was a legal nullity. To the contrary, it was a
binding order that thereafter established the law of the case on
all matters not specifically superseded by a later court order.
Utah R. Civ. P.7(b)(2) provides, in part:
Orders.
An order includes every direction of the court
including a minute order made and entered in writing and not
included in a judgement. . . .
Before the promulgation of Rule 7(b) (2) , its purpose was served by
a statute, rather than a rule:
Every direction of a court or judge, made or entered in
writing and not included in a judgment, is denominated an
order.
Utah Code Ann. § 104-42-1 (1943).
In Foreman v. Foreman, 111 Utah 72, 176 P.2d 144, 149 (1946)
the plaintiff argued that the court was powerless to hold her in
contempt for failing to obey an oral order.
In rejecting her
contention, the Utah Supreme Court construed § 104-42-1:
(continued...)
1

entered into a contract, that the contract had sufficient terms to
be enforced, and that the parties intended to be bound by the terms
of a lease.

(R. 495, Add. B ) . Judge Pat B. Brian, Judge Noel's

successor, never made any
to be bound.

finding that the parties did not intend

Thus, Judge Noel's order does establish the law of

the case below regarding intent.
If the June 11 hearing had in fact been a summary judgment
proceeding Brown's would have responded with appropriate counteraffidavits

and deposition

testimony.2

Brown's

did not do so

1

(...continued)
[S]aid order was reduced by the clerk of the court as a
minute entry. We hold that this is all that Section 10442-1 requires. We have an order of the court "entered in
writing" by the clerk of the court . . .
•

*

*

Since we hold that the order in the form given by the
court was a valid, lawful order it follows that the
plaintiff's disobedience is a contempt of court . . .
The trial court reduced its December 11, 1995 Order to writing.
(R. 495, Add. B ) . Foreman and Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2) therefore
establish that an oral order by a judge is in fact an "order" once
reduced to a minute entry. Admittedly, Judge Noel's order was not
a "final" order as defined in Utah R. App. P. 4(a) , but that is not
the issue.
2

At pages 44-45 of their opposing brief, the Olches claim
that Brown's has somehow waived its right to argue the June 11
hearing was not a summary judgment hearing.
Brown's is not
arguing, however, that the trial court had no right to schedule the
June 11 hearing. Brown's point is that the June 11 hearing the
trial court scheduled was not a summary judgment hearing.
The
procedure the Olches and the trial court followed ambushed Brown's
to the extent the hearing evolved — two hours before trial — into
a summary judgment hearing. As a consequence, the decisions the
Olches cite at page 46 of their opposing brief are largely
irrelevant. Moreover, in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817
P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991), the Court held that the scheduling of a
summary judgment hearing to be heard in less than 10 days "will
void the grant unless the violation amounts to harmless error."
Brown's shows below that the procedure the trial court followed was
hardly harmless.
In Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178, 1182 (Utah
19 93) the Court overturned a summary judgment on issues that the
(continued. . . )
2

because there was no indication at any time prior to that hearing
that the trial court would make any evidentiary rulings.

This

procedure effectively ambushed and sandbagged Brown's when the
Olches made, and the trial court considered, evidentiary arguments
at the hearing.
The

consequences

of this procedure

Olches' opposing brief.

appear

throughout the

One example is illustrative of all:

At

page 43 the Olches argue that "there was not ever any contention in
this case" of a certain factual issue.
asked

the

trial

court

to

make

When, however, Brown's

findings

regarding

Brown's

contentions and proffers of what the trial evidence would have
been, the Olches successfully argued to the trial court:
Your honor makes findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and a ruling. Now Counsel wants to come in and say let's
put in what our contentions are, and then let me speak
for the defendants, and argue what their contentions
might have been, had the case been tried and gone to a
jury. That is wholly improper in findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
They are not to set forth the
contentions.
(R. 1533-34).
In this case, the Olches'
method of putting allegation before factual inquiry is
reminiscent of the trial in Alice in Wonderland . . .
Consider your verdict," the King said to the
jury.
"Not yet, not yet!" the Rabbit hastily
interrupted.
"There's a great deal to come
before that!". . . .

2

(...continued)
notice of hearing did not make "express reference to." The Olches
argue at page 46 that the parties "had fully briefed all the legal
issues." They do not contend, nor can they in good faith contend,
however, that Brown's ever had any reason to believe, or warning,
that they were required to file with the court before that hearing
all of Brown's evidence on all those legal issues.
3

"Give your evidence, said the King:
"and
don't be nervous, or I'll have you executed on
the spot.". . . .
"No, no!" said the Queen.
verdict afterwards."

"Sentence first —

Sexton v. Servaas, 830 F. Supp. 475, 480 n.5

(S.D. Ind. 1993),

dismissed on other grounds, 844 F. Supp. 471 (1994).
The trial court characterized the June 11 hearing in advance
as merely a hearing on purely legal issues.3

Over its course it

expanded from a hearing on the narrow issue of whether a judge or
jury should decide overriding specific performance questions to a
hearing on a motion to dismiss. The Olches' counsel never disputed
until their brief Brown's counsel's characterization of the June 11
hearing as involving a "motion to dismiss".

(R. 1500, 1534) . This

Court affirms a motion to dismiss "only where it clearly appears
that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could
prove to support their claim."

See e.g., Brittain v. State, 882

P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1994) (emphasis added).
To justify their receiving a "sentence before the verdict",
the Olches

adopt

the behavior

of

another Alice

in Wonderland

character:
"When J use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean —
neither more nor less."

3

At pages 46-47 of their opposing brief, the Olches contend
that "Brown's obtained the dismissal of the claims asserted by 330
Partners in its counterclaim."
An examination of the record
discloses, however, that the trial court dismissed that claim sua
sponte, and as a matter of law. Brown's counsel"obtained" nothing.
He merely gave two short responses totalling sixteen lines to
questions that the trial court directly asked him.
(R. 1323).
4

"The question is, " said Alice, "whether you can
words mean so many things."

make

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be
master — that's all."
L. Carroll, Alice Through the Looking-Glass

(1872)

(quoted in

United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484, 499 (2d. Cir. 1991) (Pratt,
J., dissenting)).
An examination of the record in this case makes clear that the
Olches' claimed "undisputed" facts are not undisputed at all, and
that Brown's could prove facts sufficient to support their claims.
First, the Olches repeat ad nauseam their incantation that
"Brown's would not have entered into a lease unless 330 Partners
agreed to all of the more than thirty changes demanded by Brown's
counsel in October, 1994."
at 8, 11, 16, 44).

(Olches' Brief at 39-40; see also id.

In truth, Tom Brown repeatedly testified that

Brown's was willing to negotiate those items.

(R. 257, numbered

page and unnumbered reverse page).
Second, the Olches repeatedly assert that Brown's would not
have

entered

into

a

lease

unless

it

represented

agreement to lease for the two option periods.
10, 16, 48).

a

"binding"

(Olches' Brief at

Again, this statement palpably misrepresents Tom

Brown's testimony.

The Olches tried this same misrepresentation

before the trial court by repeatedly asking it to expressly find
that Brown's insisted on "enforceable" option periods.

(R. 1360,

1477-79; 1482) . The trial court refused to make any such finding.
(R. 1482; 1485; 1422, Add. C ) . Because the trial court refused to
find Brown's insisted on "enforceable" option periods, the Olches
now assert, Humpty Dumpty-like, that Brown's insisted on "binding"

5

option periods.

The two words are synonymous.

The trial court

"found"4 that Brown's insisted on neither.
Third, the Olches assert that Brown's tried to get the Olches
to agree on the option period lease rates before Brown's would sign
a lease.

(Olches' Brief at 9, 12, 13).

To the contrary, the

testimony at trial would have been that the Olches, not Brown's,
insisted on establishing in advance the option period lease rates.
(R. 1314, 1359, 1369) .
In that regard, the Olches' counsel wrote Brown's counsel on
September 22, 1994:

" [T]he [Olches'] request for your client to

come back to 330 Main Street Partners with a lease proposal, based
on the $30 per square foot market rate, needs to be answered by the
end of the day Monday, September 26th."
Fourth,

the

Olches

erroneously

assert

that

"all

of

the

negotiations between the parties for a lease were in writing."
(Olches' Brief at 38, 44). Tom Brown's trial testimony would have
been that during a September 14, 1994 telephone conversation with
defendants Jon Olch and Henry Sigg, Olch and Sigg expressed their
desire

to establish

the option period

execution of the lease.

lease

rates before

the

On September 19, Tom Brown replied in

writing that he could not "respond" to Olch's and Sigg's request to

4

Brown's counsel questioned the necessity or appropriateness
of "findings" under the circumstances:
"But findings in the
context of a motion to dismiss are a real funny animal. These are
not like findings anywhere else in jurisprudence, because there are
no facts, except for anything that may have been stipulated to.
The only thing in here that truly is a classic finding is finding
14." (R. 1500). In any event, the trial court properly determined
that Brown's never required "enforceable" or "binding" option
periods.
Brown's only expected the Olches to negotiate option
period rents in good faith. See page 20, infra.
6

establish option-period rents as quickly as he had hoped.

(R.

887) .
The
September

evidence
22, 1994

at

trial

would

further

have

the Olches' counsel5 wrote

been

Brown's

that

on

counsel

confirming that the parties had conducted oral discussions "over
the past four to six weeks."

The Olches' counsel continued:

"It

is my understanding that, based on those discussions, the only
remaining point to be settled between the parties is that of the
rental rate."

On September 30, Brown's counsel concurred that the

parties had reached agreement on all terms except rent, and also
noted that the Olches', not Brown's, had urgently

insisted on

establishing the option period rents then, rather than at the
beginning of each option period.

(R. 259)

Brown's counsel made

the appraisal suggestion that the Olches refer to at page 28 of
their brief solely in the context of the Olches' urgent demand that
Brown's propose within four days future option period renewal rates
acceptable to the Olches.

Tom Brown would have testified that he

and the Olches ultimately agreed to establish the option period
renewals at "fair market value".

(R. 882, 883, 887, 1370).

The truly undisputed facts before the trial court did not
justify its dismissal of Brown's claims.

Moreover, the legal

posture of that hearing gave Brown's no advance notice that the
trial court expected Brown's to put all their evidence in the

5

Because the Olches' (the parties to be charged) counsel
wrote this letter, it is immune from the Olches' statute of frauds
arguments. Moreover, the Olches' entire statute of frauds argument
ignores the impact of Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 139.
See generally Medesco, Inc. v. LNS Int'l., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 920,
926-27 (D. Utah 1991) . Medesco and § 139 make clear that the
Olches' statute of frauds argument is unavailing.
(R. 1278).
7

record at a hearing two hours before trial.

There was no factual

basis for the trial court's dismissal of Brown's claims.
shows

in

the

following

subpoints

that

the

trial

Brown's

court

also

improperly applied the law to Brown's claims.
B.

The Jury, Not the Trial Court, Should Have Determined Brown's
Fraud Claims.
Curiously, the Olches nowhere in their opposing brief attempt

to justify the trial court's Conclusion Nos. 4, 5 and 6.

(R. 1424-

25, Add. C ) .
In his August 5, 1994 letter
baldly

admits

that

(1) he

(R. 882), defendant Jon Olch

needed

the

Basic

Leasee

to

obtain

financing6; (2) he never intended to honor the Basic Lease; and (3)
he and defendant Henry Sigg told Brown's that the Premises "would
be ready for occupancy by the end of 1994."
Brown's trial evidence would have been that the Olches were
aware

that

upon

their

execution

of

the

Basic

Lease,

Brown's

immediately ordered approximately $170,000 worth of shoes for sale
at the Premises during the Winter 1994-95 season.
492, 1302-05, 1371-72).

(R. 262, 301,

The Olches knew that Brown's made that

major financial commitment, and had retained an interior designer,
in

reliance

on

an

agreement

intention of honoring.

the

Olches

at

that

time

(R. 13 03,

In response to all this evidence of their duplicity, the

Olches respond with a single legal argument:
damages.

no

In fact, defendant Sigg encouraged Brown to

ship those shoes for storage to a shed Sigg owned.
1372).

had

(Olches' Brief at 48).

6

Brown's suffered no

In addition to benefit-of-the-

On October 8, 1993 Brown's gave the Olches a letter (R.
991) necessary for them to obtain financing. (R. 262) . The Olches
never explain why they needed a second letter to obtain financing.
8

bargain damages, a plaintiff may also recover reliance damages
occasioned by fraudulent conduct.
P. 2d

602,

determine

609

(Utah

Brown's

1974) .

lost

See, e.g., Lamb v. Bangart, 525

Whatever

profits

to

be,

a

jury

Brown's

may

ultimately

unquestionably

suffered reliance damages.
The Olches themselves cannot explain or justify the trial
court's refusal to let the jury decide if Brown's suffered damages
— out-of-pocket or lost profits — in reasonable reliance on the
Olches' false representation that they intended to honor the Basic
Lease.

In fact, the trial court's insensitivity to the Olches'

conduct in a fraud context prejudicially permeated its view of
other legal issues.

C

The Basic Lease Is an Enforceable Contract; The Trial Court's
Failure to Recognize that Fact Caused It to Commit Multiple
Legal Errors.
1.

The Basic Lease is a Contract.

In their Brief, the Olches make repeated references to the
testimony of one of Brown's experts, Richard G. Robins ("Robins").
The Olches conveniently omit Robins' conclusion, based on his years
of experience as a leasing agent of commercial retail property that
in the Basic Lease the parties came to an economic agreement on the
basis for a lease.
Basic Lease.

All necessary parties signed the

They recited that the terms contained therein were

"agreed upon".
agree".

(R. 958).

Thus, the Basic Lease was not an "agreement to

It was an agreement.

It was a contract.

These inescapable facts distinguish this case from Crismon v.
Western Company of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987) .
There,
various

the

trial

letters

court
the

specifically

parties

found,

exchanged
9

after

trial,

constituted

a

that

mutual

rejection of each other's attempts to form an agreement.

Relying

on the basic contract law principle that a contract is not formed
without a meeting of the minds, this Court affirmed the trial
court's

evidentiary

finding.

Crismon

accordingly

establishes

nothing in this case, because the Basic Lease explicitly recites
that each and every term and condition contained therein had been
"agreed upon by and between" Brown's and the Olches.
The Basic Lease therefore memorializes the terms obligating
the Olches to lease the Premises when completed to Brown's on the
terms recited in the Basic Lease.

Independent of any testimony by

Rich Robins or anyone else, Judge Noel found as a matter of law7
that the parties intended to be bound by its terms.

Judge Brian

made no contrary finding.
Accordingly, as Brown's show at pp. 1-2, supra, the law of the
case below is that the Basic Lease
parties to its terms.

is a contract binding the

Indeed, the very purpose of the Basic Lease

was to bind Brown's and the Olches to its economic terms.
showed

at p.

13 of their

initial brief

that

Brown's

the Basic

Lease

contained all the essential terms of the parties' agreement and
that the mere fact that part of the performance is that the parties
will enter into a contract

in the future does not render the

original agreement any less binding.
resulting

lease would

technical

document.

7

necessarily

The Olches contend that the
be

some

complicated,

To the contrary, Brown's

Utah law is "well
writing and the language
parties must be determined
See, e.g., R & R Energies
1074 n.5 (Utah 1997).

hyper-

leasing expert,

settled" that "when a contract is in
is unambiguous, the intention of the
from the words of the agreement . . . "
v. Mother Earth Indus., 936 P.2d 1068,

10

Robins, would have testified that frequently in commercial leasing
situations, the parties use a "boiler plate" lease.

(R. 959).

The Massachusetts Supreme Court explained why the Basic Lease
is a binding contract:
The parties agreed in writing . . .
to execute a
lease in the future, and there is nothing in what they
signed which permits an inference that it would have no
effect until they signed the ultimate lease . . . From
the moment the parties signed that document they were
contractually bound to execute a lease in accordance with
its terms, . . . No contract otherwise binding is to be
treated as a nullity solely because it is a contract to
execute still another document or instrument in the
future. Every agreement for the purchase or sale of real
estate contemplates the future execution of a deed and
perhaps mortgages and other instruments, but such
agreements are not by reason thereof alone unenforceable.
Sands v. Arruda, 270 N.E.2d 826, 829 (Mass. 1971).
Courts do not easily destroy such contractual rights:
"Where the matters left for future agreement are
unessential, each party will be forced to accept a
reasonable determination of the unsettled point." . . .
" [t]he law does not favor, but leans against, the
destruction of contracts because of uncertainty; and it
will, if feasible, so construe agreements as to carry
into effect the reasonable intentions of the parties if
that can be ascertained."
Wong

v.

DiGrazia,

386

P.2d

817,

827

(Cal.

1963)

(citations

omitted).
2.

The Basic Lease Can and Should Be Specifically Performed.
The trial court's failure to appreciate that the Basic

Lease was a binding contract signed by all necessary parties led it
to commit multiple legal errors.

With respect to Brown's specific

performance claim, the trial court

failed to realize that the

initial three-year term of the Basic Lease was the dog, and the two
option periods were the tail.

As a result, both the trial court

and the Olches have the tail wagging the dog.
11

With respect to the initial three-year period the Olches argue
only that the Basic Lease is not specifically enforceable because
it lacks a commencement date.
this naked assertion.

The Olches cite no authority for

In fact, the law is to the contrary:

"The

failure to specify a definite commencement date is not fatal to the
creation of a term for years." Byrd Cos., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust
Nat'l.

Bank,

482

So.2d

247,

252

(Ala.

1985);

cf. , Orpheus

Vaudeville Co. v. Clayton Inv. Co.. 41 Utah 605, 128 P. 575, 578
(1912)

(when a landlord

is building,

altering

or repairing

a

building "the lessee usually is to take possession of the building
or premises when completed, altered, or repaired, and the agreement
often also contains a lease.")

"Usual" covenants and provisions

are incorporated into leases unless the parties manifest a contrary
intent.

See Wyuta Cattle Co. v. Connell, 299 P. 279, 282 (Wyo.

1931).

Thus, the absence of an express commencement date is not

fatal to Brown's specific performance claim.
The

Olches

make

only

one

other

unavailability of specific performance.

argument

regarding

the

They argue the rent for

the two option periods is too indefinite for specific performance.
The indefiniteness of option period rents is, however, no bar to
the specific performance of an initial period that is subject to
clear and definite rental rates.

See e.g.. Sands v. Arruda, 270

N.E.2d

The Olches

826,

829

(Mass. 1971) .

identify

no

legal

authority holding that the initial 3-year term of the Basic Lease

12

is unenforceable and void ab initio merely because the two option
periods may be.8
In its Red Queen-like rush to order Brown's execution before
hearing

the evidence necessary

to render a proper verdict

on

Brown's specific performance claims, the trial court ignored the
analysis appropriate in all Utah specific performance actions:
It may be perfectly proper for counsel to invoke
every technical rule, whether applicable or not, to
absolve his client from the contractual obligations
assumed by the latter. It is not the duty of a court,
however, to yield to the counsel's contentions in that
regard, and to make a strained effort to find some flaw
in a contract whereby a party may escape liability from
performing a plain and unequivocal obligation which he
voluntarily assumed, and for doing so has received and
retains an adequate consideration.

"When land, or any estate therein, is the subjectmatter of the agreement, the inadequacy of the legal
remedy is well settled, and the equitable jurisdiction is
firmly established. Whenever a contract concerning real
property is in its nature and incidents entirely
unobjectionable—when it possesses none of those features
which, in ordinary language, influence the discretion of
the court—it is as much a matter of course for a court of
equity to decree its specific performance as it is for a
court of law to give damages for its breach."
Where
therefore, a contract is clearly established in which one
of the parties bound himself to sell, or did sell,
specific real property, a prima facie right to have such
a contract specifically performed arises. If nothing is
made to appear which could influence or invoke the
8

The Olches do nothing to explain or justify the trial
court's dismissal of Brown's specific performance claims because of
non-joinder of the Tenants.
Bonneville Tower Condominium
Management Committee v. Thompson Michie Associates, 728 P.2d 1017
(Utah 1986) unequivocally holds that a trial court commits
reversible error by dismissing a specific performance claim with
prejudice because a plaintiff fails to join an indispensable party.
The Olches' claim Bonneville Towers does not apply because there
the dismissal occurred "at the outset" of the proceeding. (Olches'
Brief at 34) .
The Olches do not explain, however, why the
prejudice is greater at the outset than it is when defendants such
as the Olches sandbag plaintiffs by waiting until 6 days before
trial to raise the issue, as happened here.
13

discretion of a court of equity to justify is refusal to
decree specific performance, a decree requiring the party
to perform must follow, as a matter of course, as stated
by Mr. Pomeroy.
(citation omitted).
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 623-24 (1912) .
Brown's is entitled to a decree of specific performance at
least for the first three years the parties agreed to in the Basic
Lease.

Moreover, Brown's are entitled to a decree that the Olches

are obligated to negotiate the terms of both the lease and the
option period rents9 in good faith.
3.

The Olches Were Obligated to Negotiate (1) a Formal
Lease; and (2) The Option-Period Rents in Good Faith.

Inexplicably, the trial court utterly failed to consider the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing
Findings and Conclusions.

(the "Covenant") in its

(R. 1417-27, Add. C ) . The trial court

simply ignored and dismissed those claims.
The Olches' citation to Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916,
921 (Utah 1993) confirms that the Covenant governed the parties'
conduct in connection with the Basic Lease.

Andreini makes clear

the Covenant governs the parties' conduct whenever there is "some
type of preexisting contractual relationship."

Brown's has shown

at pages 9-10, supra, that the Basic Lease is a contract.
As a result, the authorities the Olches cite at pages 34-35 of
their brief are irrelevant to this Court's analysis because none of
the litigating parties had ever entered into a contract.

For

example, the Olches offer at page 35 an extended quotation from
Trustees

of

the

First

Presbyterian

9

Church

v.

Howard

Company

Brown's showed at pages 33 & n.9 of its initial brief, and
at page 20, infra, that the trial evidence would have established
that the parties' agreement regarding the option period rent was
specifically enforceable.
14

Jewelers, 97 A.2d 144

(N.J. 1953).

A later New Jersey opinion

makes clear, however, that the Howard parties never reached a
meeting of the minds on essential contract terms.

See Berg Agency

v. Sleepworld-Willingboro, Inc., 346 A.2d, 419, 423 (N.J. Super.
1975) . The Berg court distinguished Howard from another situation
where "both parties signed the same document so that there can be
no question of the meeting of their minds on the provisions in that
document."

Id. at 423.

Basic Lease.

Both the Olches and Brown's signed the

They became

contractually bound

to its terms,

including the negotiation of a formal lease containing its terms.
Candid Productions, Inc. v. International Skating Union, 53 0
F. Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), another decision the Olches rely on,
reflects

the

same

situation.

There,

the

prior

contract

had

expired, and Candid argued the defendant was required to negotiate
a new contract in good faith.

That is not the case here.

Brown's

and the Olches already had a contract that expressly required the
parties to incorporate its provisions into a lease.
court

expressly

observed

that

the law requires

negotiate the lease terms in good faith:

The Candid

the Olches

to

"Where the parties are

under a duty to perform that is definite and certain the courts
will

enforce

a

duty

of

good

faith,

including

good

faith

negotiation, in order that a party not escape from the obligation
he has contracted to perform."

Id. at 1335

(citation omitted)

(emphasis added).
Similarly, in Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corporation, 727 F.2d
257 (2d Cir.) cert, denied, 469 U.S. 828 (1984), the parties never
jointly executed any agreement such as the Basic Lease that recited
their agreement to all essential contractual terms.
15

Instead, the

parties exchanged unsigned, see id. at 260, drafts that contained
"provisions

that

conditioned

execution and delivery."

their

Jd. at 262.

binding

effect

on

formal

The court therefore found

there was no duty to negotiate an initial contract in good faith.
See id. at 264.

At the same time, however, the court recognized

that in other situations, the parties "may be bound to negotiate in
good faith to reach an agreement."
One

court,

analyzing

the

JEd. at 264.
holdings

of

both

Candid

and

Reprosvstem, concluded that those decisions did not require goodfaith negotiations because the parties had never reached a binding
underlying contract in either case:
However, those cases deal with the so-called
"agreement to agree," which is less an agreement than a
stage of negotiations and which courts refuse to
recognize as imposing limitations and obligations—i.e.,
which courts often refuse to recognize as a contract.
See Candid Prods. , 530 F. Supp. at 1334-35. We deal here
with a fully enforceable
contract with
complete
provisions on all essential subjects. To the extent that
defendants are arguing that courts cannot second-guess
negotiating tactics, they are incorrect.
Courts are
often called upon to determine whether a party negotiated
in good faith.
For example, courts must determine
whether an insurance company failed to settle a personal
injury lawsuit in good faith and instead subjected its
insured to liability above his coverage.
In re Gulf Oil/Cities Servs. Tender Offer Litiq., 725 F. Supp. 712,
739 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) .
Likewise, a case the Reprosystem court referred to in its
analysis explicitly confirms a duty to negotiate in good faith
where, as here, there is an initial contract, such as the Basic
Lease, that anticipates the execution of a formal agreement:
There is, however, the argument that at the very
least the agreement of May 8th carried with it the
obligation to negotiate the terms of a definitive
agreement in good faith and to execute the contract on
the terms that had been agreed upon. For this argument,
16

plaintiff relies on Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial
Industries, Inc., 248, A.2d 625 (Del. 1968).
Assuming
that there was a binding agreement on May 8th, we would
agree that an obligation to negotiate in good faith a
definitive agreement was implied but, as Itek held,
absent such good faith, plaintiff could sue for a breach
of contract.
Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) .
More
reviews,

recently,
treatises

one
and

Federal

District

Court

canvassed

law

judicial

decisions

from

throughout

the

country before concluding that agreements to negotiate in good
faith are not unenforceable as a matter of law.
v. Relisys, 958 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D.N.H. 1997).

See Howtek, Inc.
In describing the

required process, the Relisvs court described the factual inquiry
appropriate to determine whether good faith negotiations occurred:
The question is whether it is to be inferred from the
totality of the employer's conduct that he went through
the motions of negotiations as an elaborate pretense with
no sincere desire to reach an agreement if possible, or
that it bargained in good faith, but was unable to arrive
at an acceptable agreement with the union.
Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
The Olches argue at page 3 6 of their opposing brief that Utah
juries are incapable of making such a determination.
never explain why, however.
&

565

The Olches

Brown v. Weis, 871 P. 2d 552, 564 n.18

(Utah App. 1994) establishes

that

juries exist

express purpose of making such determinations.

for the

Weis also makes

clear that a trial court errs in deciding such issues in connection
with a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Brown's and the Olches specifically "agreed upon" the Basic
Lease

provisions,

provisions

and

into a final

agreed

they

would

"incorporate"

those

lease to be executed by the parties.
17

Defendant Jon Olch admitted his duty to negotiate a formal lease.
(R. 462). The Olches now seek to create the erroneous impression
that the parties have already done their best to negotiate a lease,
but have failed.10

(Olches' Brief at 38-39).

In their initial brief at pages 9 and 50, Brown's showed that
the two leases the Olches submitted materially changed the terms
they had already agreed to in the Basic Lease.
dispute they sought to change those terms.

The Olches do not

Because of the Olches'

unilateral changes to the parties' binding agreement, Brown's was
under no obligation to assent to, negotiate, or even consider, the
Olches' proposed leases:
[T]he parties to a contract to lease have the right to
demand that the lease to be executed shall comply with
the terms of the agreement, and a proffered lease which
does not conform to the agreement need not be accepted or
executed.
51C C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 196(4) (1968) . In fact, the Olches'
proposal of leases that changed the provisions of the Basic Lease
constituted a refusal to perform on the Olches' part.
James, 285 P.2d 86, 89-90 (Cal. 1955).
10

See Lewis v.

Similarly, " [a] n agreement

At pages 10-11, 17 and 38 of their opposing brief, the
Olches assert that they and Brown's did negotiate, but could not
agree on "many" or "a number" of points, and that such failure
indicated nothing more than "normal disagreements between a
landlord and tenant." This facially reasonable statement ignores
the facts that (1) the Olches insisted on provisions that
materially changed the Basic Lease; and (2) "many" or "a number" of
the disagreements resulted from commercially unreasonable and
sometimes outrageous terms the Olches demanded. Brown's expert,
Robins, testified in his deposition that in all his years of retail
leasing experience he had "never seen" certain provisions before.
(R. 980-81).
If the trial court had permitted a trial, Brown's
would have introduced evidence establishing the Olches' repeated
insistence on terms designed to make their proposed leases
unsignable. The situation the Olches created in the process was
far from "normal disagreements between a landlord and tenants."
The Olches were determined to "break" a contract the>y no longer
needed once they obtained their financing.
18

to execute a lease is not broken by the refusal to sign a lease
which

imposes

agreement."

terms

not

provided

for

or

contemplated

in

the

Albiani v. United Artists Corp., 169 N.E. 435, 437

(Mass. 1930).
In Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug
Centers, Inc. , 889 P.2d 445, 456 (UtahApp. 1995) cert, denied, 899
P. 2d 1231

(Utah 1995) this Court held that both landlords and

tenants cannot exercise any discretion in a lease relationship
capriciously

or

in

bad

faith.

The

Olches

argue

they

have

discretion regarding the ancillary terms of the lease the Basic
Lease required the parties to negotiate.

It necessarily follows

that the Olches are bound to conduct those negotiations for those
terms in good faith.
The Olches never truly engaged in negotiations, good-faith or
otherwise.

Instead, they twice demanded that Brown's accept terms

directly contrary to terms the Olches had agreed to in the Basic
Lease.

In connection with its remand, this Court should either (1)

order the Olches to specifically perform their obligation to engage
in good-faith negotiations of a lease consistent with the Basic
Lease;

(2) instruct the trial court to permit the jury

(a) to

determine the usual non-economic terms of commercial retail leases,
and (b) declare those terms to be the non-economic portions of the
lease contemplated by the Basic Lease; (3) instruct the trial court
that the Olches' failure to negotiate in good faith renders them
liable as a matter of law for Brown's damages; or (4) instruct the
trial court that the jury should determine whether the Olches' past
conduct violated the Covenant.

19

Finally, the Olches do not address at all Brown's argument, at
page 31 n.8 of their initial brief, that the Olches were also
obligated to negotiate in good faith the rents for the option
periods.

At page 33 of their initial brief, Brown's identifies

numerous courts that have specifically enforced agreements to set
future lease rates at the fair market value existing at the time of
renewal.
decision

Indeed, counsel for Brown's is aware of no reported
holding

enforcement.

that

such

a

standard

is

too

indefinite

for

The Olches have not identified any such decision.

Tom Brown would have testified that the parties agreed the option
period rents would be the then-existing fair market value of the
Premises.

Accordingly, on remand, this Court should also instruct

the trial court that if the jury finds the parties made such an
agreement, the Olches are under the additional duty to negotiate
these renewal rates in good faith, and that, if the parties are
unable to agree on fair market value, the trial court is required
to do so.
D.

Individual Plaintiff Brown's General Offices Has a Legally
Cognizable Claim
Brown's does not challenge the trial court's Finding No. 15

(R. 1422, Add. C) . They do contend that Conclusion No. 9 (R. 1425,
Add. C) in no way necessarily results from that finding.
In Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760

(Utah 1984) the Utah

Supreme Court expressly recognized that an individual partner has
standing to sue a party who contracts with the partnership if the
individual partner "suffered direct injury personally."

20

The analytical basis

for this rule

is the fact that

all

partners of a partnership are ultimately in privity of contract
with entities that contract with the partnership:
It is fundamental that all partners are agents of
each other, that a contract entered into by the
agent is a contract entered into by the principal
and that all partners are liable on any contract
executed by a single partner in the name of the
partnership.
If a partner may be sued for
nonpayment or other breach of the contract, he
certainly is privy to the contract.
Barnes v. Campbell Chain Co., Inc., 267 S.E.2d 388, 389 (N.C. App.
1980).
A

plaintiff

must

either

be

(1)

in

privity

with

the

defendant; or (2) a third-party beneficiary, in order to maintain
an action for breach of contract.

See, e.g., American Towers

Owners Ass'n. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Utah
1996) . Because Brown's General Offices was in privity of contract
with

the Olches,

it has

particularized damages.

standing

to

sue

for

its

foreseeable

Privity renders superfluous the third-

party beneficiary analysis the Olches suggest.11 Accordingly, this
11

Because the trial court erroneously ruled as a matter of
law that Brown's General Offices could not sue for its
particularized economic losses, it never permitted the jury to
consider the foreseeability and amount of Brown's General Offices'
individual damages.
In a related vein, the Olches suggest the trial court
properly dismissed Brown's General Offices' claims because it had
not properly pled them as special damages. Even if the special
damages rule applies to this claim, trial courts err as a matter of
law in dismissing special damages claims for failure to plead with
specificity. See Costin v. Malone, 402 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. App.
1981) .
Additionally, such dismissal impermissibly shifts the
burden of proof:
Moreover, the appellees did not meet their burden
essential to obtain a summary judgment. The moving
party must prove the non-existence of a material
(continued...)
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court should reverse the trial court's Conclusion No. 9 (R.1425,
Add. C) and order a trial of Brown's General Offices' separate and
distinct damage12 claims.
E.

The Trial Court Correctly Dismissed the Olches' Counterclaim
The Olches' counterclaim was not, as they contend,

"abuse of process".

for

An abuse of process claim relates only to

events that occur after a lawsuit has been filed.

See Keller v.

Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 & n.15
1995) aff'd. , 78 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1996).

(D. Utah

On the other hand,

" [a]n action challenging the initiation of a lawsuit is an action
for

malicious

prosecution

or

for

wrongful

bringing

proceedings, and not for abuse of process."

Jd.

counterclaim

of

challenges

Brown's

initiation

of

civil

The Olches'
this

action.

Accordingly, their claim is for malicious prosecution or wrongful
bringing of civil prosecution.

11

( . . . continued)
fact in issue.
Here the appellees did not
demonstrate that the appellants sustained no special
damages. The appellees cannot shift this burden by
pointing to the record and arguing that the
appellants had neither alleged nor proven special
damages.

Id.
12

At page 40 of their brief the Olches gratuitously claim
that they first learned of Brown's General Offices' damage claims
"shortly before trial." In fact, by January 23, 1996 - 140 days
before trial, and before the trial court even set the trial date
(R. 573) — the Olches knew not only the existence, but also the
exact amount ($293,525), of Brown's General Offices' claimed
damages. (R. 541-542) . Utah has no inflexible rule regarding the
pleading of special damages.
The only concern is whether a
defendant has notice of a plaintiff's claimed damages. See Cohn v.
J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975). The Olches
had ample notice.
22

To prevail on their claim, the Olches must satisfy the
requirements of Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 674-76.13
Finding

Nos.

1-8

supporting

the

dismissal

of

the

In its
Olches'

counterclaim (R. 1408, Add. D to this Brief), the trial court made
findings on each element of the Olches' counterclaim.
Numerous judicial decisions

14

hold that whether a plaintiff

had probable cause under §§ 674 and 675 is a question of law, not

13

§ 674.
General Principle
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation
or procurement of civil proceedings against another is subject to
liability to the other for wrongful civil proceedings if
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the
claim in which the proceedings are based, and
(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have
terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought.
§ 675.
Existence of Probable Cause
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation
or procurement of civil proceedings against another has probable
cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the existence of
the facts upon which the claim is based, and either
(a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts
the claim may be valid under the applicable law, or
(b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of
counsel, sought in good faith and given after full disclosure of
all relevant facts within his knowledge and information.
§ 676.
Propriety of Purpose
To subject a person to liability for wrongful civil
proceedings, the proceedings must have been initiated or continued
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper
adjudication of the claim on which they are based.
14

See, e.g.. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
, 123 L Ed 2d 611,
625 n.7, 626 (1993); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
758 P.2d 1313, 1321 (Ariz. 1988); Knight v. Cordrv, 913 P.2d 1206,
1209 (Ks. App. 1995); Putt v. Kremp, 894 P.2d 354, 357 (Nev. 1995);
Greenbercr v. Wolf berg, 890 P.2d 895, 903 n.29 (Okl. 1994); Alvarez
v. Retail Credit Ass'n. of Portland, 381 P.2d 499, 502 (Or. 1963);
cf., Sheldon Appel Co. v. Oliker, 765 P.2d 498, 504 (Cal. 1989)
("To avoid improperly deterring individuals from resorting to the
courts for resolution of disputes, the common law affords litigants
the assurance that tort liability will not be imposed for filing a
lawsuit unless a court subsequently determines that the institution
of the lawsuit was without probable cause."
(Emphasis in
original)).
23

of fact.

Similarly, a determination of whether a legal position

was "without merit" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 is a
question of law, not of fact.

See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202,

203 (Utah App. 1991) . Relying on Judge Noel's initial finding in
Brown's favor15 (R. 495, Add. B ) , and its own view of the merits
of Brown's filing of their complaint, the trial court expressly
found that, as a matter of law, Brown's legal positions did not
exhibit a lack of probable cause or a purpose other than securing
a proper adjudication of Brown's claims.
to marshal

the evidence

supporting

Because the Olches fail

the trial

court's

detailed

findings, this Court assumes the record supports those findings.
See, e.a., Macris & Assocs.t Inc. v. Images & Attitude, Inc., 319
U.A.R. 33, 36 (Utah App. 1997).
The

trial

court

thus

correctly

dismissed

the

Olches'

counterclaim.
II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons this Court should reverse the
trial court's dismissal of Brown's claims.

It should affirm the

trial court's dismissal of the Olches' counterclaim.
DATED September /7

1997.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
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Bruce Wycoff NJT-^--^
Attorneys for Appellants
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In its ruling the trial court explained part of its thought
process:
"There is, in the Court's opinion, evidenced by the
ruling of Judge Noel, a basis for reasonable people to differ on
whether an enforceable agreement existed between plaintiff and
defendant."
(R. 1324)
228183.1
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JON OLCH, JANET OLCH,
HENRY SIGG, and 330 MAIN
STREET PARTNERS,
Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 950300038CN

JON OLCH, JANET OLCH,
HENRY SIGG, and 330 MAIN
STREET PARTNERS,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa
corporation; BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO.,
an Iowa partnership; TOM BROWN;
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an
Iowa corporation; and John Does 2-5,
Counterdefendants.

180170.1

14i»<

A hearing was held in this matter on June 11, 1996 at the hour of 8:30 a.m., at the
commencement of trial, for the purpose of addressing certain legal issues in the matter.
Plaintiffs appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Paul Van Dam and
Bruce Wycoff of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. Defendants Jon and Janet Olch
appeared in person and by and through their counsel of record, Richard D. Burbidge of Burbidge
& Mitchell. Defendants 330 Main Street Partners and Henry Sigg appeared in person and by
their counsel of record Robert Felton.
The court, at an earlier hearing held June 6, 1996, had requested that both parties file
memoranda respecting the legal issues that they believed should be determined by the court prior
to and/or during the trial. Both parties filed written memoranda as requested by the court.
The court, having carefully reviewed the memoranda filed by the parties and having heard
extensive oral arguments and the responses by counsel to specific inquiries by the court
concerning undisputed facts and the respective positions of the parties, and the court being fully
apprised in the matter, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
The court determines that there is no material dispute regarding the following facts:
1.

Plaintiffs, Brown's Shoe Fit Co., Brown's General Offices, and Tom Brown took

an active part in the initiation of civil proceedings against defendants in this matter.
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2.

At a December 11, 1995 hearing Judge Frank G. Noel ordered that the March 18,

1994 Basic Lease Provisions constituted an enforceable contract between the parties, and that the
parties intended to be bound by its terms.
3.

The plaintiffs did not act in bad faith or without a factual basis in filing their

Complaint herein.
4.

There was a basis for reasonable people to differ on whether an enforceable

agreement existed between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
5.

Plaintiffs acted in good faith in asserting their claims against defendants. Plaintiffs

did not act unreasonably or in any way approach this lawsuit for totally wrong reasons.
6.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint primarily for the purpose of securing the proper

adjudication of their claims stated in the Complaint.
7.

Plaintiffs' belief in the facts on which their Complaint was based was reasonable.

8.

Plaintiffs' belief that under those facts their claims might be valid under applicable

law was reasonable.
9.

Some time after filing their Complaint, plaintiffs caused a lis pendens to be

recorded against the property which was the subject matter of this action.
10.

The plaintiffs did not act in bad faith or without probable cause in recording that

lis pendens.
11.

Plaintiffs did not record the lis pendens for an ulterior purpose for which it was

not intended.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

A person is liable for the wrongful use of civil proceedings only when that person

acts without probable cause, for the purpose of harassment or annoyance and with malice. In
other words, to be actionable, such an action must be brought primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claims on which the proceedings are based.
2.

Plaintiffs are not liable to defendants for wrongful use of civil proceedings.

3.

A person is liable for abuse of process if, even though an action may have been

properly initiated, and even though the process was lawfully issued, if the process was used for
an ulterior purpose for which it was not intended.
4r

The filing of a lis pendens is absolutely privileged.

5.

Plaintiffs are not liable to defendants for abuse of process.

6.

None of defendants' counterclaims against plaintiffs has merit.

7.

Defendants' counterclaims that were, or could have been, brought in this action

should be dismissed with prejudice qml q % ^ merits.
DATED this

day of yWgttSf 1996.
BY THE COURT:

^

Honorable Pat a. Brian
Third District Court Judge
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Approved as to form:
BURDIGE & MITCHELL

Richard D. Burbidge
Attorneys for Defendants Jon Olch
and Janet Olch

Robert Felton
Attorneys for Defendants 330 Main
Street Partners and Henry Sigg
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

Paul Van Dam
Bruce Wycoff
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
On this

fj$r

day of A«gnsT, 1996, pursuant to Rule 77(d), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, and following entry thereof, I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, via first class
United States mail, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to the following:

R. Paul Van Dam
Bruce Wycoff
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444
Richard D. Burbidge
Burbidge & Mitchell
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Robert Felton
39 Exchange Place, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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